Reasonable Factors Other Than Age: The Emerging
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Judith J. Johnson†
It is beyond question that ageism plays a particularly pernicious
role in the workplace. Older workers face widely held societal stereotypes that they are cognitively, socially, and performatively deficient in the workplace. They are also the targets of ageist attitudes,
ageist communication, and age discrimination.1

I. INTRODUCTION
In spite of two recent Supreme Court cases that ostensibly reinstated a more expansive interpretation of discrimination under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), the protection that the
ADEA affords still faces the same danger that threatened it before these
decisions. The courts, including the Supreme Court, have been allowing
employers to interpose defenses that correlate so strongly with age that
they can be used as thinly veiled covers for discrimination.2 If the Court
is serious about enforcing the purpose of the ADEA, it must interpret the
“reasonable factor other than age” (RFOA) defense to protect older employees from discrimination by requiring employers to justify adverse
actions that use age-correlative criteria such as greater seniority,3 higher
position4 or salary,5 higher healthcare costs,6 proximity to retirement,7 or
†Professor of Law, Mississippi College of Law; B.A., University of Texas at Austin, 1969; J.D.,
University of Mississippi, 1974. I would like to thank Donald Campbell, Deborah Challener, Elizabeth Jones, Mark Modak-Truran, and Alina Ng for editorial assistance and Pat Zimmerman for research assistance.
1. Robert McCann and Howard Giles, Ageism in the Workplace: A Communication Perspective, in AGEISM STEREOTYPING AND PREJUDICE AGAINST OLDER PERSONS 188 (Todd D. Nelson ed.,
MIT Press 2002).
2. See infra Part V.B.2.
3. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 242–43 (2005).
4. Id.
5. See, e.g., Townsend v. Weyerhaeuser Co., No. 04-563, 2005 WL 1389197, at *13 (W.D.
Wis. June 13, 2005).
6. Id. It should be noted that the employer may provide less in healthcare benefits for older
workers. See infra note 71.
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retirement status.8 The ADEA was designed to preclude consideration of
these factors, or at least to require that they be closely scrutinized.9
The problem is that the courts, including the Supreme Court, have
not come to grips with what “reasonable” means for RFOA purposes. At
this point, the courts seem to be interpreting “reasonable” to be whatever
the employer wants it to mean, without reference to the effect on the protected class. It surely cannot be reasonable to apply factors that have
such an obvious impact on older workers without justifying the need for
burdening the protected class in particular. An employer-showing that
less discriminatory alternatives were not feasible is the usual method of
showing that a factor was reasonable. In fact, without a showing that
alternatives were not feasible, the employer must have been aware of a
substantial risk that he would be adversely affecting the protected class;
in other words, the employer must have been acting recklessly with regard to whether he was engaging in discrimination.10 The ADEA imposes liquidated damages on employers who act recklessly, so recklessness is already a state of mind punished by the Act.11 The employer is
acting recklessly when he is subjectively aware of a substantial risk that
he will be discriminating against the protected class.12 This article argues that if the employer is acting with a sufficiently culpable state of
mind with regard to whether the criterion treats the protected class unfavorably, he should not be able to interpose the criterion itself as a reasonable method of achieving his goals, without further justification.13 For
example, employer actions based on seniority are usually reasonable
unless more senior employees are adversely affected. If the employer
uses greater seniority as the criterion for a layoff, for instance, he should
have to explain why he did not use a criterion with a less obvious impact
on the protected class.
In Smith v. City of Jackson, the Supreme Court agreed that the
ADEA was designed to attack practices that have a disparate impact on
older employees, unless such practices are justified by a “reasonable factor other than age.”14 The Court has also decided that RFOA15 is an af-

7. See, e.g., Silver v. Leavitt, No. 05-0968, 2006 WL 626928 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2006).
8. See, e.g., Rollins v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 06-081, 2006 WL 3302538 (S.D. Tex.
Nov. 13, 2006).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 147–56.
10. See infra Part VI.
11. See infra Part II.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 282-83..
13. See infra Part VI.
14. 544 U.S. 228, 253 (2005).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). See infra note 71 for the full text of the provision.
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firmative defense, as to which the employer bears the burden of persuasion;16 however, the Court has indicated that RFOA will not be difficult
to prove,17 and lower courts are so holding.18
Prior to these recent Supreme Court cases, but after a case decided
by the Court in 1993, Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins,19 lower courts began
restricting protections previously afforded by the ADEA. Although most
of these restrictions have been removed, the meaning of the RFOA defense has not been resolved.20
The most serious obstacle to proving discrimination was the lower
courts’ refusal to apply the disparate impact theory to the ADEA. Thus,
the plaintiff was limited to the disparate treatment theory of discrimination,21 which is more difficult to prove.22 This limitation was removed in
Smith v. City of Jackson, in which the Supreme Court decided that the
disparate impact theory applies to the ADEA.23 The Court, however,
went further and decided that RFOA would be the defense to disparate
impact, which was an issue that had not been presented.24 The Court
further held, with little analysis, that the employer’s justification was an
16. Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 128 S. Ct. 2395 (2008).
17. See infra text accompanying notes 99, 130–31.
18. See infra Part V.B.2. Determining when RFOA should be interposed as a defense, other
than in disparate impact cases, is beyond the scope of this article. As I discuss in two other articles
on the RFOA defense, whenever the employee presents substantial proof of discrimination, such as
when an employer uses age-correlated criteria, he should have to bear the burden of persuasion to
show RFOA. Judith J. Johnson, Rehabilitate the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Resuscitate the “Reasonable Factors Other Than Age” Defense and the Disparate Impact Theory, 55
HASTINGS L. J. 1399, 1430 (2004) [hereinafter Rehabilitate]; Judith J. Johnson, Semantic Cover for
Age Discrimination: Twilight of the ADEA, 42 WAYNE L. REV. 1, 64–68 (1995) [hereinafter Semantic Cover]. The employer should also have to bear the burden of persuasion to prove RFOA in cases
of widespread disparate treatment similar to pattern or practice cases. See Rehabilitate, supra, for an
explanation of these theories.
19. 507 U.S. 604 (1993). See infra text accompanying notes 83–86 for a discussion of the
case.
20. Of the four common court-imposed restrictions, the first was refusing to apply the disparate
impact theory to the ADEA, thus limiting proof of discrimination to disparate treatment. Second,
those courts that continued to apply the disparate impact theory to the ADEA failed to recognize that
the defense to disparate impact should not be a watered-down version of business necessity, but
RFOA. Third, most courts applying disparate impact, whatever defense they applied, assigned the
burden of persuasion to the plaintiff throughout the case. Fourth, factors that obviously correlated
with age were no longer considered impermissible but were actually accepted as defenses to the
ADEA. The first three of these restrictions have been removed; however, the fourth restriction,
allowing a selection criterion that correlates with age to be a defense, has not been resolved and
makes recent plaintiffs’ victories fairly meaningless.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 87–91.
22. See Mack A. Player, Wards Cove Packing or Not Wards Cove Packing? That Is Not the
Question: Some Thoughts on Impact Analysis Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 31
U. OF RICH. L. REV. 819, 831 (1997).
23. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005).
24. Id. at 239.
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RFOA that precluded liability.25 Subsequently, in Meacham v. Knolls
Atomic Power Laboratory, the Court decided that RFOA is an affirmative defense, as to which the employer bears the burden of persuasion,
but the Court gratuitously noted that it may make little difference in the
outcome.26 However, neither of these cases answered what has become
an important question in age discrimination: What does RFOA mean?
No arguments were presented in either City of Jackson or Meacham regarding the meaning of RFOA,27 and there was no reference to any authority on the meaning of RFOA.28 Consequently, the Court’s unexplained pronouncement in City of Jackson that the defendant’s justification was reasonable leaves the meaning of RFOA uncertain.29 Before
Meacham, the lower courts generally put the burden of persuasion on the
employee and required very little to establish RFOA. The lower courts
were responding to City of Jackson, and the result was that disparate impact cases under the ADEA were bound to fail.30 Even though the Court
decided in Meacham that the employer bears the burden of persuasion to
show RFOA,31 the Court insinuated in both cases that RFOA would not
be difficult for the employer to prove.32
Therefore, for the purpose of this article, this question is presented:
How difficult will it be to prove RFOA? If the employer may interpose
any defense that does not discriminate on its face against older employees, RFOA will mean nothing more than “legitimate non-discriminatory
reason,” which is the defense to disparate treatment.33 A “legitimate
non-discriminatory reason” is “any” factor other than age. Allowing the
employer to use unjustified age-correlated factors gives “reasonable factors other than age” little meaning beyond “any” factor other than age, an
interpretation precluded by the Court in recent decisions.34 Nevertheless,
the lower courts have failed to scrutinize the meaning of “reasonableness” for RFOA purposes.35 This article examines the possibilities and
concludes that “reasonable” must include an employer-justification of
any factor that has an obvious impact on older workers, such as seniority,
higher salary, or any of the factors cited above. Despite recent Supreme

25. Id. at 241–42.
26. 128 S. Ct. 2395, 2404 (2008). See infra text accompanying notes 130–31.
27. See infra notes 95, 130, 137.
28. See Meacham, 128 S. Ct. at 2403; City of Jackson, 544 U.S. at 242–43.
29. See infra Part III.C.
30. See infra Part V.B.2.
31. Meacham, 128 S. Ct. at 2402.
32. See infra text accompanying notes 99, 130–31.
33. See infra Part IV.B.2.
34. See infra Part III.
35. See infra Part V.B.

2009]

Reasonable Factors Other Than Age

53

Court plaintiffs victories, unless courts interpret RFOA to forbid the unjustified use of age-correlated factors, the result will be the same for
plaintiffs: Age-stereotyping will continue unabated.
Both the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and
the Department of Labor, the agencies interpreting the ADEA, have always equated RFOA with factors that are shown to predict success in the
job.36 As Justice Scalia pointed out, City of Jackson was a perfect case
for deferring to the agencies’ interpretation of the ADEA.37 The early
judicial interpretations of the ADEA were consistent with the EEOC and
Department of Labor’s understanding of RFOA38 and showed that factors
that were “inherently time-based, such as experience, years on the job,
and tenure . . . [were] inherently age-related and thus [could not] be considered ‘factors other than age.’”39
The danger of inherently age-related factors is that many superficially reasonable employer practices negatively impact older employees
and make it difficult for them to obtain and retain employment.40 For
example, in a reduction in force, if the employer decides to cut costs by
eliminating higher-salaried workers, this inevitably has a negative impact
on older workers who have been employed longer and benefited from
raises over the years. If the older worker is then laid off, he may have
difficulty obtaining new employment because he is considered overqualified and, to match his former salary, overpaid.41 Being able to use the
disparate impact theory to prove that a higher-salary justification adversely impacts older employees and putting the burden of persuasion on
the employer to show RFOA does not alleviate the problem. Disparate
impact discrimination occurs when the employer uses an unjustified neutral employment practice that has a disparate impact on a protected
class.42 If the employer may interpose higher salary as an RFOA, the
older worker is no better protected than he was before City of Jackson
and Meacham. While saving money is clearly a reasonable goal, the
employer should not be able to defend the disparate impact on older employees by interposing as an RFOA a method of achieving that goal if it
36. See infra text accompanying notes 150–52. The Department of Labor was originally responsible for administering the ADEA. The EEOC has the current responsibility. See infra note
151.
37. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 243 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring).
38. See infra text accompanying notes 147–156.
39. Mack A. Player, Title VII Impact Analysis Applied to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Is A Transplant Appropriate?, 14 U. TOL. L. REV. 1261, 1278 (1983). Professor Player
also thought that RFOA, as defined here, should be the defense to disparate impact cases under the
ADEA. Id. at 1278–83.
40. See Rehabilitate, supra note 18, at 1400.
41. Id.
42. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430–31 (1971).
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obviously correlates with age without justifying the use of such a factor.
In order to use a factor such as eliminating higher-paid workers, the employer should have to explain why that factor was used instead of a factor with a less obvious impact on the protected class.
When Congress passed the ADEA, it recognized that the number of
unemployed older people in the workforce was becoming a serious problem and that this problem was caused in large part by age discrimination.43 Acting on the assumption that disabilities caused by the aging
process affected job performance and should be valid disqualifications,
Congress created the RFOA defense.44 Current research challenges the
assumption that age-related incapacity is prevalent, and consequently,
Congress may have been acting on incorrect assumptions regarding older
people when it passed the ADEA.45
Since Congress enacted the ADEA in 1967, social scientists have
extensively studied the phenomenon of age discrimination. A new understanding of ageism should now figure into the development of the law
of RFOA.46 Social scientists have concluded that although most people
will live well into “old age,” older people are a category against which
younger people are generally prejudiced.47 Older people are no longer
seen as fonts of wisdom; rather, they are seen as less competent, even if
endearing and warm.48 These prejudices lead to older people being
43. 29 U.S.C. § 621(a) (1988).
44. See Steven J. Kaminshine, The Cost of Older Workers, Disparate Impact, and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 42 FLA. L. REV. 229, 301–02 (1990).
45. See infra notes 53–57. Age discrimination was not included in Title VII because it was
“different.” See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005), where the Court recognized that
Congress’s decision to limit the coverage of the ADEA by including the RFOA provision
is consistent with the fact that age, unlike race or other classifications protected by Title
VII, not uncommonly has relevance to an individual’s capacity to engage in certain types
of employment. To be sure, Congress recognized that this is not always the case, and that
society may perceive those differences to be larger or more consequential than they are in
fact. However, as Secretary Wirtz noted in his report, “certain circumstances . . . unquestionably affect older workers more strongly, as a group, than they do younger workers.”
Wirtz Report 11. Thus, it is not surprising that certain employment criteria that are routinely used may be reasonable despite their adverse impact on older workers as a group.
Moreover, intentional discrimination on the basis of age has not occurred at the same levels as discrimination against those protected by Title VII. While the ADEA reflects Congress’ intent to give older workers employment opportunities whenever possible, the
RFOA provision reflects this historical difference.
Id. at 241.
46. See McCann & Giles, supra note 1, at 198.
47. See Becca R. Levy & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Ageism, AGEISM, supra note 1, at 49.
48. Amy J.C. Cuddy & Susan T. Fiske, Doddering but Dear: Process, Content, and Function
in Stereotyping of Older Persons, AGEISM, supra note 1, at 9–10. The authors attribute this phenomenon to modernization that has increased the size of the older population; retirement, which has
removed older people from prestigious jobs; technological advances that have produced jobs that
older people are not trained for; urbanization that has divided younger people from older family
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viewed less positively in interviews and thus being less likely to be hired.
They are seen as less trainable, resistant to change, less promotable, and
likely to perform less ably.49 Experts have found that the origin of this
prejudice against old people is in large part based on a fear of our own
mortality.50 In addition, the authors of these studies note the stereotypical views that older workers should retire and make way for the young
fuel stereotypical attitudes and discrimination.51 Because the negative
attitudes about older people are not based on a strong hatred, negative
views of older people are more acceptable.52
The surprising fact is that most generalizations about the effects of
aging are unfounded. Numerous studies have found that brain activity in
healthy people does not differ substantially between ages twenty and
eighty. The only major change in intellectual capacity is in speed and
reaction time. “Nevertheless, stereotypical beliefs about the mental decrements of older individuals are ubiquitous and well-documented in the
research literature.”53 Additionally, “[i]n contrast to widely held stereotypes that depict older workers as chronically absent and injury prone,
the research literature on absenteeism and workplace injuries suggests
quite a different story.”54 With regard to the stereotypes that older workers are unable to cope with change, literature shows that older workers
are comparable to younger workers in their ability to be re-trained.55
Also, several studies show a nonexistent or even slightly positive correlation between age and job performance.56
Now that social scientists have refuted the assumption that many
common age distinctions are accurate,57 it is interesting to note that the
ADEA itself was based on inaccurate stereotypes. Age discrimination
members; and public education, which has removed the need for the wise elder to pass on the culture. Id. at 12–13.
49. Id. at 18.
50. Id. at 1. See Jeff Greenberg, Jeff Schimel & Andy Martens, Ageism: Denying the Face of
the Future, AGEISM, supra note 1, at 27, for a complete discussion of this cause of age discrimination.
51. McCann & Giles, supra note 1, at 176.
52. Levy & Banaji, supra note 47, at 50–51. See Joann M. Montepare & Leslie A. Zebrowitz,
A Social-Developmental View of Ageism, AGEISM, supra note 1, at 77, for a discussion of how these
attitudes developed.
53. McCann & Giles, supra note 1, at 167.
54. Id. at 169. Studies have found a negative or insignificant correlation between age and
absenteeism. Employers rate older employees more highly in terms of reliability and dependability.
Id. at 169–70. The studies show a tradeoff in on-the-job accidents: younger workers are more accident-prone, while older workers take longer to recover. Id. at 170.
55. Id. at 171–72.
56. Id. at 172. Output of older employees has been found to be equal to younger employees,
and older workers are more accurate and steadier in their performance. Id.
57. Id.
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has long been considered less invidious than other forms of discrimination.58 To the contrary, it is more insidious because it is more acceptable.59 Thus, courts must scrutinize common age-correlated factors more
closely. In the midst of a recession with layoffs and plummeting retirement accounts,60 discrimination against older people will be even more
devastating.
This article will examine the possible meanings of “reasonable factors other than age” and suggest a solution. Part II will briefly describe
the ADEA generally. Part III will examine the recent Supreme Court
cases that have addressed RFOA. Part IV will explore the possible
meanings of RFOA by reviewing the hierarchy of employment discrimination defenses. Part V will fit RFOA into the hierarchy and investigate
recent judicial interpretations. Part VI will explain the solution, which is
to require employers to justify criteria that obviously impact older workers, such as seniority and higher salary. Part VII will conclude.
II. THE PASSAGE OF THE ADEA, ITS PROVISIONS AND
INTERPRETATIONS
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination
based on race, sex, religion, color and national origin.61 The ADEA was
passed shortly after Title VII took effect. During the Title VII debates,
Congress pondered including age as a prohibited basis for discrimination
but decided instead to refer the issue of age discrimination to the Secretary of Labor for study.62 In response, the Secretary issued what came to
be known as the “Wirtz Report,”63 in which he noted the seriousness of
the age-discrimination problem.64 The report led to the passage of the
ADEA in 1967.65

58. See Kaminshine, supra note 44, at 306–07.
59. See supra text accompanying note 52.
60. Jennifer Levitz & Philip Shishkin, More Workers Cite Age Bias After Layoffs, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 11, 2009, at D1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123673216882289971.html; see
also Peter S. Goodman, Jack Healy, & David Stout, Job Losses Hint at Vast Remaking of U.S. Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2009, at A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/07/business/economy/07
jobs.html
61. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq (1989 & Supp. 1995).
62. See 110 CONG. REC. 2596–99; 9911–13; 13,490–92 (1964).
63. Michael Bentley, Note, How American Employers (Almost) Learned to Respect Their Elders: Smith v. City of Jackson and the Availability of the Disparate Impact Theory Under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 26 MISS. C. L. REV. 347, 350 (2007).
64. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR TO THE CONGRESS UNDER SECTION 715 OF
THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (1965).
65. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 8 Stat. 602 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
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The ADEA prohibits employment discrimination based on age
against persons over the age of forty.66 The language of the ADEA’s
central prohibition was taken word for word from Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.67 Thus, the ADEA, on its face, provides the same
basic protections from discrimination based on age that Title VII provides based on race, sex, religion, color, and national origin.68 The principal differences between the two acts are in the remedial provisions and
some of the defenses.
The ADEA’s remedial provisions were drawn not from Title VII,
but from the Fair Labor Standards Act, which provide for liquidated
damages for willful violations.69 An employer engages in a willful violation when he is reckless with regard to whether he is violating the
ADEA.70 Some defenses to the ADEA71 are also available under Title
66. Id. at 602, 607. The ADEA originally protected persons ages forty to sixty-five. The
upper age limit was removed in 1986. Age Discrimination in Employment Amendments of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-592, § 2(c), 100 Stat. 3342, 3342.
67. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 233–34 (2005) (citing Lorillard v. Pons, 434
U.S. 575, 584 (1978)).
68. Compare Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 8 Stat. 602
(codified as amended in scattered Sections of 29 U.S.C.) with Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e et seq., 2000e–2(a) (1989 & Supp. 1995). The ADEA provides:
It shall be unlawful for an employer:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s
age.
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 8 Stat. 602 (codified as
amended in scattered Sections of 29 U.S.C.). “Except for substitution of the word ‘age’ for the
words ‘race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,’ the language of that provision in the ADEA is
identical to that found in § 703(a)(2) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).” City of Jackson,
544 U.S. at 233.
69. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1990). The Supreme Court has held that the violation is willful if “the employer . . . knew or showed reckless
disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by the ADEA.” Trans-World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 125 (1985).
70. See infra text accompanying notes 260–62.
71. The defenses provide in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for an employer, employment agency, or labor organization—
(1) to take any action otherwise prohibited under subsections (a), (b), (c), or
(e) of this section where age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business, or where the
differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age, or where such
practices involve an employee in a workplace in a foreign country, and compliance with such subsections would cause such employer, or a corporation
controlled by such employer, to violate the laws of the country in which such
workplace is located;
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VII.72 However, the ADEA contains additional defenses not found in
Title VII. An employer may defend against an ADEA claim by showing
its actions were based on “reasonable factors other than age,” were pursuant to a bona fide benefit plan, or constituted discipline or discharge
for good cause.73
Although the Court has considered differences between the statutes
to be significant,74 because of the similarities, Title VII has often served
as a source of interpretation for the ADEA,75 and vice versa.76 Under
Title VII, the Supreme Court identified two theories of discrimination:
(2) to take any action otherwise prohibited under subsection (a), (b), (c) or (e)
of this section—
(A) to observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system that is not intended to evade the purposes of this Act, except that no such seniority
system shall require or permit the involuntary retirement of any individual specified by section 12(a) of this Act because of the age of such
individual; or
(B) to observe the terms of a bona fide employee benefit plan—
(i) where, for each benefit or benefit package, the actual amount
of payment made or cost incurred on behalf of an older worker
is no less than that made or incurred on behalf of a younger
worker, as permissible under section 1625.10, Title 29, Code of
Federal Regulations (as in effect on June 22, 1989); or
(ii) that is a voluntary early retirement incentive plan consistent
with the relevant purpose or purposes of this Act. Notwithstanding clause (i) or (ii) of subparagraph (B), no such employee benefit plan or voluntary early retirement incentive plan
shall excuse the failure to hire any individual, and no such employee benefit plan shall require or permit the involuntary retirement of any individual specified by section 12(a) of this Act,
because of the age of such individual. An employer, employment agency, or labor organization acting under subparagraph
(A), or under clause (i) or (ii) of subparagraph (B), shall have
the burden of proving that such actions are lawful in any civil
enforcement proceeding brought under this chapter; or
(3) to discharge or otherwise discipline an individual for good cause.
29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
72. 42 U.S.C., § 2000e-2(e), (h) (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1988). The Bona Fide Occupational Qualification (“BFOQ”) defense is not absolute under Title VII but applies only to sex,
religious, and national origin discrimination, not to race or color. Id. § 2(e).
There are defenses under Title VII that are also not contained in the ADEA, such as action taken
pursuant to a merit system or a system that measures quantity or quality of production or a professionally developed test. Id. § 2(h).
73. See supra note 71 for full text of defenses.
74. See Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 128 S. Ct. 2395, 2406 (2008), Smith v. City of
Jackson, 540 U.S. 228, 240 (2005).
75. See Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400 (1985); Monce v. City of San Diego,
895 F.2d 560, 561 (9th Cir. 1990); MACK A. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 517
(1988); Kaminshine, supra note 44, at 231.
76. See, e.g., Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 611 (1993). The Supreme Court again
approved this proposition in the City of Jackson case, discussed below. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. at
233–34.
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disparate impact and disparate treatment.77 Disparate treatment discrimination occurs when the employer intentionally treats persons of different
protected classes differently.78 Disparate impact discrimination occurs
when the employer uses an unjustified neutral employment practice that
has a disparate impact on a protected class.79 Courts originally applied
both theories to the ADEA;80 however, controversy arose regarding
whether the disparate impact theory rightly applied.81 Other questions
arose as well: (1) If disparate impact applied to the ADEA, would the
business necessity defense apply, as under Title VII, or would RFOA
apply, as under the ADEA but not Title VII? (2) Should the employer
bear the burden of persuasion to prove the defense? (3) If the defense is
RFOA, what employer justifications would be considered reasonable?
The Court resolved the first two of these issues in two cases: Smith v.
City of Jackson and Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, described in the next part. Some background is useful first.
Until 1993, courts consistently interpreted the ADEA in line with
Title VII in regard to disparate impact.82 However, in Hazen Paper v.
Biggins in 1993, the Court created confusion as to the meaning of RFOA
when it said that the defense to discrimination under the ADEA was any
factor other than age, without referring to the RFOA defense.83 This
could be interpreted to mean that the disparate impact theory did not apply to the ADEA, even though the Court said it was addressing intentional discrimination, not disparate impact.84 Hazen Paper was a disparate treatment case in which the plaintiff contended that being discharged
to prevent his pension from vesting was intentional discrimination based
on age.85 The Court said that pension-vesting and age, while correlated,
were not perfectly correlated; as a result, the plaintiff had to prove more

77. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). See also McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (constructing the burden and order of proof in an intentional discrimination case).
78. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
79. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. at 431.
80. See Rehabilitate, supra note 18, at 1408–09. After Hazen Paper, the courts ceased to apply
the disparate impact theory to the ADEA. See City of Jackson, 544 U.S. at 236–37; see infra text
accompanying notes 87–91. However, City of Jackson recognized that the theory does apply to the
ADEA. See Part III.A.
81. See Semantic Cover, supra note 18, at 48–52.
82. See City of Jackson, 544 U.S. at 236–37.
83. 507 U.S. 604, 611 (1993) (finding that the employer is not guilty of intentional discrimination under the ADEA if his decision “is wholly motivated by factors other than age . . . even if the
motivating factor is correlated with age, as pension status typically is”).
84. Id. at 611.
85. Id. at 609.
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than the mere fact that he was discharged because his pension was about
to vest.86
Despite the Court’s clearly stating that it was not deciding whether
disparate impact applied to the ADEA,87 the lower courts clutched at
language from Hazen Paper to hold that disparate impact did not apply
under the ADEA.88 Lower courts also found further support in the concurrence to Hazen Paper, which opined that there were substantial arguments why disparate impact did not apply under the ADEA.89 Neither
the issue of the meaning of RFOA nor disparate impact was argued in
Hazen Paper.90 Nevertheless, after Hazen Paper, most lower courts held
that the disparate impact theory did not apply to the ADEA.91
In the 2005 case of Smith v. City of Jackson, the Court decided that
the disparate impact theory applies under the ADEA and that RFOA is
the defense, but that the burdens of proof articulated in Wards Cove v.
Atonio also apply to the ADEA.92 From this and other loose language in
City of Jackson, most lower courts considering the issue held that a
plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion to refute RFOA.93 In addition,
courts also decided that almost any employer justification would suffice
to establish RFOA,94 even though the issue of RFOA had not been presented in City of Jackson.95 Subsequently, in the 2008 case Meacham v.
Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, the Court decided that the employer
bears the burden of persuasion to prove RFOA.96 These two cases are
discussed in the following part.

86. Id. at 611–12.
87. Id. at 610.
88. See Rehabilitate, supra note 18, at 1416 n.101.
89. 507 U.S. at 618 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
90. Id. at 610.
91. See Rehabilitate, supra note 18, at 1416 n.101.
92. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005). See infra text accompanying notes
198–201 for a discussion of Wards Cove.
93. See Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 128 S. Ct. 2395, 2400 (2008).
94. Id.
95. Brief of Petitioner at *3, Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005) (No. 03-1160),
2004 WL 1369172. The Petitioners argued that City of Jackson did not address any issue beyond
whether disparate impact claims are ever cognizable under the ADEA. Id. The case presented no
questions relating to the elements of a disparate impact claim, the defenses that might be available to
employers, or the allocation of burdens of proof between the parties. Id. The Petitioners argued that
the lower courts can and should address those issues in the first instance, consistent with Congress’s
intent that the statute should be given practical construction. Id.
96. Meacham, 128 S. Ct. 2395.
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III. RECENT SUPREME COURT CASES
A. Smith v. City of Jackson
In Smith v. City of Jackson, the Supreme Court decided that the disparate impact theory applies to the ADEA. The Court based the decision
primarily on the fact that the language of the ADEA was taken word-forword from Title VII, which originally created the disparate impact theory.97 The Court decided, however, that the plaintiff had failed to show
the criterion causing the disparate impact.98 The Court also opined, with
little or no analysis, that the criteria used by the City were “reasonable
factors other than age,” which precluded liability.99
City of Jackson involved a pay plan initiated by the City of Jackson,
Mississippi. The plan resulted in police officers with less than five years
of service receiving proportionately more in raises. Most of the officers
in the protected class had more than five years of service.100 The Court
decided that although disparate impact is cognizable under the ADEA,
the plaintiffs had failed to prove their case.101
The Court held that there were two textual differences between the
ADEA and Title VII that indicated that liability under the disparate impact theory should be narrower under the ADEA than it is under Title
VII. The first was that the 1991 Civil Rights Act amended Title VII to
codify the disparate impact theory and to modify Wards Cove v. Ato97. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. at 233–34. The Court had unanimously decided that the disparate impact theory applied to Title VII, so the same language in the ADEA could not be interpreted
to exclude the theory. Id. at 234. In addition, the Court noted that the defense of “reasonable factors
other than age” provides additional support that Congress intended to proscribe employment criteria
that had a disparate impact unless they were “reasonable.” Id. at 239. Finally, regulations promulgated by the agencies that administered the ADEA support the view that the disparate impact theory
applies to the ADEA. Id. at 239–40.
The decision is a plurality decision; however, Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment that
disparate impact applies to the ADEA, but based his conclusion on the reasonableness of the agency
interpretation. Id. at 243 (Scalia, J., concurring). In other words, five justices agreed that disparate
impact applies to the ADEA. The issue is no longer in doubt because the opinion in Meacham was
joined by a majority of the Court. See infra text accompanying note 113.
98. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. at 241.
99. Id. at 242–43.
100. Id. at 231. The plan divided the five basic officer positions into steps and half-steps. The
wage range was based on wages paid in comparable cities in the Southeast. Most of the officers
were in the three lowest ranks, where there were officers both over and under age forty. The officers
in the two highest ranks were all over forty. Those in the two highest ranks were given raises that
represented a smaller percentage of their salaries, but the raises were higher in dollar amount than
the raises given to officers in the lower ranks. The evidence showed that the City gave raises of over
10% to more than 66% of the officers under forty, but only 45% of the officers over forty received
such raises. Additionally, officers with less than five years of service received higher percentage
raises than those with longer service. Id.
101. Id.
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nio.102 Because the 1991 amendments did not apply to the ADEA in this
regard, Wards Cove applies to the ADEA.103 In City of Jackson, the
plaintiffs had failed to comply with the Wards Cove requirement of identifying “the specific test, requirement or practice within the pay plan”
that was causing the disparate impact.104
The second textual difference—the existence of the defense of
RFOA in the ADEA and not in Title VII—requires RFOA to be the defense to a disparate impact case.105 The Court said that, unlike race and
the other classifications protected under Title VII, age may have relevance to a person’s ability to do the job.106 Thus, some criteria that adversely affect older workers more than younger workers may be used if
they are reasonable.107 In addition to determining that the plaintiffs had
failed to identify the criterion causing the disparate impact, the Court
said that the City of Jackson’s reason for implementing the pay plan was
an RFOA. The Court reasoned that the City’s explanation for the differential was the need to make the salaries of junior officers competitive in
the market. “Thus the disparate impact is attributable to the City’s decision to give raises based on seniority and position. Reliance on seniority
and rank is unquestionably reasonable given the City’s goal of raising
employees’ salaries to match those in surrounding communities.”108 The
Court opined that the City’s decision to give employees with less seniority and lower positions a larger raise “for the purpose of bringing salaries in line with that of surrounding police forces was a decision based on
a ‘reasonable factor other than age’ that responded to the City’s legitimate goal of retaining police officers.”109
The Court then diluted the effect of applying the disparate impact
theory in another respect by declaring inapplicable the part of the business necessity test that allows the plaintiff to prevail by showing that
there are less discriminatory alternatives. The Court said that RFOA
does not include such an inquiry.110 “While there may have been other

102. Id. at 240. See infra text accompanying notes 199–202 for an explanation of Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), which modified the business necessity defense and,
inter alia, required the plaintiff to bear the burden of persuasion throughout the case.
103. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. at 241. See infra text accompanying notes 199–202 for a further discussion of Wards Cove.
104. Id. at 241.
105. Id. at 240.
106. Id. at 240–41.
107. Id. at 241.
108. Id. at 242–43.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 243.
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reasonable ways for the City to achieve its goals, the one selected was
not unreasonable.”111
Justice Scalia agreed with the plurality’s rationale but would have
used it as a basis for deferring to the reasonable views of the EEOC in
this regard. The concurrence noted that the regulation reflected the longstanding position of the Department of Labor, which had originally administered the Act, as well as the EEOC, which had taken this position in
several proceedings. The concurrence concluded that the EEOC’s interpretation of the statute was reasonable and entitled to deference.112
Two important issues remained after City of Jackson: who bears the
burden of persuasion regarding RFOA, and what does RFOA mean?
Only one of these issues has been resolved. With regard to who bears
the burden, the Supreme Court again decided the issue in favor of the
plaintiff.
B. Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory
Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory113 involved a reduction in force (RIF) at an atomic power laboratory in which, of the thirtyone salaried employees affected, thirty were in the protected age
group.114 The employees contended that the RIF had a disparate impact
on them, in violation of the ADEA.115 The employees’ statistical expert
showed that some of the criteria chosen to determine who would be laid
off caused the disparate impact. The jury found for the employees on the
disparate impact claim. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the
employees had not carried the burden of persuasion to show that the plan
was not reasonable.116 The Supreme Court disagreed with putting the
burden of persuasion on the plaintiffs.117
111. Id.
112. Id. See infra text accompanying notes 150–53 for a full explanation of the regulations in
this regard.
113. Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 128 S. Ct. 2395 (2008). Justice Souter wrote the
opinion for the majority of six, as opposed to the City of Jackson opinion in which only four members of the Court joined. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 229 (2005). Only Justice Thomas
dissented, arguing that disparate impact does not apply at all under the ADEA. He concurred, however, that RFOA is an affirmative defense in disparate treatment cases. Meacham, 128 U.S. at 2407
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment, id.
at 2407 (Scalia, J., concurring), and Justice Breyer took no part in the case. Id. at 2407.
114. Meacham, 128 S. Ct. at 2398.
115. Id. at 2398–99. The employees also alleged disparate treatment, but the jury did not find
for them on that claim, and they did not pursue it. Id. at 2399–2400.
116. The procedure was more complicated than this. In fact, in its first opinion, the court of
appeals affirmed the jury’s verdict. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded in light of the intervening City of Jackson decision. The court of appeals then reversed the jury verdict because it had
been based on a showing of no business necessity, rather than a showing of no RFOA. Id. at 2400.
117. Id. at 2402.
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The Court based its decision on the text of the ADEA, pointing out
that the ADEA’s prohibitions against discrimination are followed by exemptions for employer practices that would otherwise be prohibited.118
RFOA is one of those exemptions, as to which the employer bears the
burden of persuasion.119 The Court applied a principle of statutory construction—that those who claim an exception must prove it. There was
no reason to believe that Congress intended otherwise.120
The Court also noted that in enacting the ADEA, Congress had
drawn upon the Fair Labor Standards Act, especially the equal pay provisions.121 The Court had formerly recognized the undesirability of departing from consistent interpretations of the two acts. Thus, treating RFOA
as an affirmative defense was further bolstered by the fact that the Equal
Pay Act defense of “any other factor other than sex” was treated as an
affirmative defense.122
The employer argued that City of Jackson had applied the Wards
Cove123 burdens of proof to the ADEA, which precluded the court from
putting the burden of persuasion on the employer to prove RFOA as an
affirmative defense.124 Wards Cove had put the burden of persuasion on
the plaintiff throughout the case,125 and when the Court in City of Jackson said that Wards Cove applied to the ADEA, the implication was that
the burdens of proof applied also. In Meacham, however, the Court
stated that the employer was over-reading City of Jackson, that the only
part of Wards Cove that applied to the ADEA related to the plaintiff’s
burden to prove a prima facie case of disparate impact.126 Specifically,
the employee must identify the particular practice causing the disparate
impact.127
118. Id.
119. Id. at 2401.
120. Id. at 2400.
121. Id. at 2401.
122. Id. The Court also noted that its recognition of bona fide employee benefit plans as an
affirmative defense was rejected by Congress. Congress had legislatively overruled that case, stating
that the action was necessary to restore its original intent to regard the defense of bona fide employee benefit plan as an affirmative defense. Congress then changed the introductory language to
that defense to bring it in line with the language preceding the BFOQ and RFOA defenses. Id. at
2401–02.
123. In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), the Court held that the businessjustification defense for Title VII had to be disproved by the plaintiff. Congress later codified
the business necessity defense as an affirmative defense to Title VII to specifically overrule this
decision. See infra discussion accompanying notes 203–04.
124. Meacham, 128 S. Ct. at 2404–05.
125. See infra notes 198–201 for a full discussion of Wards Cove.
126. Meacham, 128 S. Ct. at 2404.
127. It should be noted that the 1991 Civil Rights Act codified the requirement of picking out
the specific practice for Title VII disparate impact claims. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(k) (Supp. III 1991).
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In Meacham, the employer also argued that RFOA means any factor other than age, whether reasonable or not. The Court rejected this
argument as having been resolved by City of Jackson.128 When the Court
in that case decided that classifications based on non-age factors that
have a disparate impact on older workers may be actionable, the Court
was implicitly rejecting the argument that RFOA means any factor other
than age.129 However, the Court in Meacham also cited City of Jackson
for the proposition that a reasonable factor may nevertheless lean more
heavily on older workers.130 The Court further added that putting the
burden of persuasion on the defendant will be important only in cases in
which the reasonableness of the non-age factor is obscure.131 The question for RFOA is now whether the non-age factor is reasonable.
Despite two Supreme Court cases applying RFOA, there is no clear
answer as to what it means. The dictum from City of Jackson and Meacham does not bode well for a restrictive meaning of RFOA, however.132
Nevertheless, because the issue of the meaning of RFOA has not properly been before the Court, there is still hope that the Court will interpret
RFOA as originally intended.133 Until that time, however, confusion persists among lower courts when interpreting the meaning of RFOA.134
C. Where Has the Supreme Court Left Us with Regard to the Meaning of
RFOA?
As noted earlier, three Supreme Court cases developed the RFOA
defense. Two of these cases, Hazen Paper v. Biggins135 and City of Jackson, led to confusion regarding RFOA application—confusion that the
Court has had to correct.136 In addition, both cases, along with Meacham, have added to the confusion about the meaning of RFOA. Most

Thus, there is no ostensible difference between the Wards Cove requirement that applies to the
ADEA and the 1991 Civil Rights Act provision that applies to Title VII.
128. Meacham, 128 S. Ct. at 2402–03.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 2403. It should be noted that the Court declined to grant certiorari on the meaning
of RFOA, so this issue was never argued. Id. at 2400 n.8.
131. Id. at 2406.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 99, 130–31.
133. See infra Part IV.A.
134. See infra Part V.B.2.
135. 507 U.S. 604 (1993). For a more complete discussion of Hazen Paper, see Rehabilitate,
supra note 18, at 1412–16.
136. See Meacham, 128 S. Ct. at 2400; Appellate Petition, Motion, and Filing at *10–13, Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 128 S. Ct. 2395 (2008) (No. 06-1505), 2007 WL 1434965.
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importantly, the issue of the meaning of the RFOA was not presented in
any of these cases.137
Now, although the Court in Meacham said that the employer bears
the burden of persuasion, it also implied that RFOA will not be difficult
to prove and will be dispositive only when the reason is obscure.138 The
Court also noted that the lower court did not hesitate to accept the employer’s defense and that the lower court would have to determine
whether the outcome of the case would change by putting the burden on
the employer.139 The Court was again foreshadowing issues not argued
in the case. Because of these interpretations of RFOA, lower courts have
already begun to find employers’ justifications reasonable, even if they
are obviously correlated—or even synonymous—with age, such as retirement, seniority, higher position, and higher salary.140
The next part will explore the possible meanings of RFOA. The
first possibility is that RFOA means the same as “legitimate nondiscriminatory reason,” which is any criterion that does not discriminate
on its face.141 City of Jackson specifically precluded this interpretation;142 however, if an employer may interpose unjustified age-correlated
factors, RFOA will mean little more than “any” factor other than age.
The question becomes what does reasonable mean in the context of
RFOA, especially in the context of factors that correlate with age? There
are four possibilities, other than legitimate non-discriminatory reason, as
discussed below: (1) bona fide occupational qualification, which requires that the criterion be essential to the business;143 (2) business necessity, which requires that the factor be shown to predict success in the
job;144 (3) business justification, which requires that the criterion be rationally related to the employer’s legitimate goals;145 and (4) “any factor
other than sex,” which is a defense to an Equal Pay Act case, but which
often requires the employer to justify a factor that historically discrimi-

137. See Rehabilitate, supra note 18, at 1433; see also Brief of Petitioner, supra note 95. In
Meacham, the Court noted:
Petitioners also sought certiorari as to “[w]hether respondents’ practice of conferring
broad discretionary authority upon individual managers to decide which employees to lay
off during a reduction in force constituted a ‘reasonable factor other than age’ as a matter
of law.” We denied certiorari on this question and express no views on it here.
128 S. Ct. at 2400 n.8 (citation omitted).
138. Meacham, 128 S. Ct. at 2406–07.
139. Id. at 2406–07.
140. See infra Part V.B.2.
141. See infra Part IV.B.2..
142. See supra text accompanying note 128.
143. See infra Part IV.B.1.
144. See infra Part IV.B.4.
145. Id.
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nates on the basis of sex.146 This part examines the possibilities and concludes that “reasonable” must include an employer justification of any
factor that has an obvious impact on the older workers. Such a justification need not be essential to the business or predict success in the job, but
it must include proof that less discriminatory alternatives were not feasible.
IV. DEFINING THE MEANING OF RFOA USING A HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE OF DEFENSES TO EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
A. History of RFOA
Before the decision in Hazen Paper v. Biggins,147 the prevailing
view was that to be a RFOA, the factor could not be correlated with
age.148 Thus, factors that are “inherently time-based, such as experience,
years on the job, and tenure . . . are inherently age-related and thus [could
not] be considered ‘factors other than age.’”149 The Secretary of Labor,
who reported on the necessity of the ADEA,150 and who administered the
ADEA in its early days,151 issued guidelines shortly after the Act was

146. See infra Part IV.B.3.
147. 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
148. See infra cases cited at note 154; Player, supra note 39, at 1278.
149. Player, supra note 39, at 1278. Professor Player also thought that RFOA as here defined
should be the defense to disparate impact cases under the ADEA. Id. at 1278–83. See Kaminshine,
supra note 44, at n.131 for studies correlating age, seniority and compensation.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 62–65.
151. The EEOC took over administration of the ADEA and retained the Secretary of Labor’s
interpretation of RFOA. Kaminshine, supra note 44, at 302–03. See Howard Eglit, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act’s Forgotten Defense: The Reasonable Factors Other Than Age
Exception, 66 B.U. L. REV. 155, 195 (1986) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 860.103(e) (1985) (rescinded)). The
EEOC position before and after City of Jackson is as follows:
Differentiations based on reasonable factors other than age.
(a) Section 4(f)(1) of the Act provides that * * * it shall not be unlawful for an
employer, employment agency, or labor organization * * * to take any action
otherwise prohibited under paragraphs (a), (b), (c), or (e) of this section * * *
where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age * * *.
(b) No precise and unequivocal determination can be made as to the scope of
the phrase “differentiation based on reasonable factors other than age.”
Whether such differentiations exist must be decided on the basis of all the particular facts and circumstances surrounding each individual situation.
(c) When an employment practice uses age as a limiting criterion, the defense
that the practice is justified by a reasonable factor other than age is unavailable.
(d) When an employment practice, including a test, is claimed as a basis for
different treatment of employees or applicants for employment on the grounds
that it is a “factor other than” age, and such a practice has an adverse impact
on individuals within the protected age group, it can only be justified as a
business necessity. Tests which are asserted as “reasonable factors other than
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passed. These guidelines provided that to be a RFOA, a criterion must
be “‘reasonably necessary for the specific work to be performed’ or
‘shown to have a valid relationship to job requirements.’”152 “[T]he Department of Labor’s contemporaneous understanding of the newly passed
statute is unusually germane, given its involvement and influence in the
legislation.”153 The lower courts generally followed the Secretary’s position.154 In the absence of extensive legislative history on RFOA,155 these
early interpretations are the most relevant indications of congressional
intent.156
Although the regulations issued by the Department of Labor made
it clear that disparate impact applied to the ADEA,157 disparate impact
was rarely applied in the early days of the ADEA.158 A majority of
courts simply assumed that an employer using criteria that correlate with
age, such as over-qualification, high salary, tenure, or seniority, was intentionally discriminating and thus guilty of disparate treatment.159
Many of these decisions were made shortly after the ADEA was enacted,
so this was the consensus regarding the intent and meaning of the ADEA
at that time.160 It was only after Hazen Paper—decided over twenty-five
age” will be scrutinized in accordance with the standards set forth at Part 1607
of this Title.
(e) When the exception of “a reasonable factor other than age” is raised
against an individual claim of discriminatory treatment, the employer bears
the burden of showing that the “reasonable factor other than age” exists factually.
(f) A differentiation based on the average cost of employing older employees
as a group is unlawful except with respect to employee benefit plans which
qualify for the section 4(f) (2) exception to the Act.
29 C.F.R.§ 1625.7 (1985).
152. 29 C.F.R.§ 1625.7 (1985).
153. Id. The EEOC, which took over responsibility for the ADEA, used the term business
necessity to describe the defense to disparate impact. See supra note 151.
154. See, e.g., Taggart v. Time, Inc., 924 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1991); Abbott v. Federal Forge, Inc.,
912 F.2d 867, 875–76 (6th Cir. 1990); Jardien v. Winston Network, Inc., 888 F.2d 1151, 1157–58
(7th Cir. 1989); White v. Westinghouse Electric Co., 862 F.2d 56, 62 (3rd Cir. 1988); Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc., 828 F.2d 1202 (7th Cir. 1987), overruled by Anderson v. Baxter HealthCare Corp., 13
F.3d 1120 (7th Cir. 1994); Reichman v. Bonsignore, Brignati & Mazzotta P.C., 818 F.2d 278, 280–
81 (2d Cir. 1987); Dace v. ACF Indus., Inc., 722 F.2d 374, 378 (8th Cir. 1983); Leftwich v. HarrisStowe State College, 702 F.2d 686, 691 (8th Cir. 1983); Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir.
1980). Contra Williams v. General Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 120, 131 n.131 (5th Cir. 1981); Laugeson v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1975).
155. The legislative history of the RFOA is sparse and inconclusive. Eglit, supra note 151, at
180–81.
156. See Kaminshine, supra note 44, at 303.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 150–52. The Court recognized this in Smith v. City of
Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 236 (2005).
158. See Rehabilitate, supra note 18, at 1410–11.
159. See cases supra note 154.
160. See Semantic Cover, supra note 18, at 27–28.
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years after the enactment of the ADEA—that the consensus regarding
age-correlated factors and the applicability of the disparate impact theory
to the ADEA began to change.161
The courts that thought that age-correlated factors were discriminatory per se were incorrect. Congress intended for employers to retain the
ability to justify decisions based on reasonable factors, even if such factors correlate with age. Otherwise, employers would be forced to retain
employees who could no longer perform.162 Hazen Paper made it clear
that factors that correlate with age are not per se discriminatory.163 The
lower courts over-read this decision, however, and began to hold that any
factor that was not facially discriminatory was a defense to an ADEA
suit.164
Now that City of Jackson and Meacham have clarified that disparate impact does apply to the ADEA, that RFOA is the defense, and that
the employer bears the burden of persuasion to prove it, the question of
the meaning of RFOA remains. Specifically, what is reasonable? Although the use of age-correlated factors should not be treated as discriminatory per se, there is a large gap between holding that agecorrelated factors are discriminatory per se and holding that such factors
161. Id. at 30–33. The Supreme Court recognized this in City of Jackson:
Indeed, for over two decades after our decision in Griggs, the Courts of Appeals uniformly interpreted the ADEA as authorizing recovery on a “disparate impact” theory in
appropriate cases. It was only after our decision in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S.
604, 113 S. Ct. 1701, 123 L.Ed.2d 338 (1993), that some of those courts concluded that
the ADEA did not authorize a disparate impact theory of liability.
City of Jackson, 544 U.S. at 236–37.
162. See Kaminshine, supra note 44, at 289. See Rehabilitate, supra note 18, at 1429.
163. 507 U.S. 604, 608 (1993).
164. With regard to whether the disparate impact theory applies to the ADEA, the courts held
as follows: the First, Fifth, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits said unequivocally that the theory
did not apply. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 351 F.3d 183 (5th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 541 U.S.
958 (2004); Adams v. Florida Power Corp., 255 F.3d 1322, 1325 (11th Cir. 2001), cert. granted, 534
U.S. 1054 (2001), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 535 U.S. 228 (2002); Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164 F. 3d 696, 700–01 (lst Cir. 1999); Ellis v. United Airlines, 73 F.3d 999, 1006–07
(10th Cir. 1996); Gehring v. Case Corp., 43 F.3d 340, 342 (7th Cir. 1994).
The Third and the Sixth Circuits did not say that disparate impact did not apply but expressed
serious misgivings. See Dibiase v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719, 732–35 (3d Cir. 1995);
Gantt v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 143 F.3d 1042, 1048 (6th Cir. 1998).
The Second, Eighth and Ninth Circuits continued to allow disparate impact claims. See Criley
v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 119 F.3d 102, 105 (2d Cir. 1997); Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d
845, 856 (9th Cir. 2000); Lewis v. Aerospace Cmty. Credit Union, 114 F.3d 745, 750 (8th Cir.
1997). The Eighth Circuit had indicated some doubt as to whether disparate impact applies, however. See Allen v. Entergy, 193 F.3d 1010, 1015 n.5 (8th Cir. 1999).
The Fourth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit had not addressed this issue. See Adams, 255 F.3d at
1325 n.5. In a case on an unrelated issue, however, the D.C. Circuit interpreted Hazen Paper to
caste doubt on the applicability of the disparate impact theory to the ADEA. Contractors’ Labor
Pool, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 323 F.3d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 2003). See Rehabilitate, supra note 18, at 1418–22
for a complete discussion of the rationales used by the various courts.
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are reasonable and thus a defense to an ADEA claim. The middle
ground is that the employer should have to justify the use of factors that
obviously correlate with age. Thus, the employer should not simply interpose a factor that correlates with age and denominate it as reasonable
without some justification. The challenge for this article is to determine
what kind of justification the employer should have to make. To put this
query into perspective, it will be helpful to explore the hierarchy of defenses to discrimination cases to see where RFOA belongs. The hierarchy of defenses about to be described starts with the most difficult defense to prove, bona fide occupational qualification, and continues to the
least difficult to prove, legitimate non-discriminatory reason. The gap in
between is where RFOA should fit.
B. Other Defenses
Any discussion of the meaning of defenses to discrimination cases
has to begin with Title VII, the patriarch of the anti-discrimination statutes.165 Because Title VII did not define discrimination, this task was left
to the courts.166 As noted above,167 the Supreme Court identified two
theories of discrimination under Title VII: disparate impact and disparate
treatment.168 Because of the similarity between Title VII and the ADEA,
the Court then applied both theories to the ADEA.169 These theories
have resulted in five defenses: bona fide occupational qualification, legitimate non-discriminatory reason, “any other factor other than sex”
under the Equal Pay Act, business necessity, and business justification.
1. Statutory Defense of Bona Fide Occupational Qualification
Bona fide occupational qualification is the only general statutory
defense for a Title VII disparate treatment case, and it is also a statutory

165. Title VII, one of the comprehensive anti-discrimination acts, was enacted in 1964. Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., (1989 & Supp. 1995). The ADEA was enacted in
1967. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90–202, 8 Stat. 602 (codified as
amended in scattered Sections of 29 U.S.C.). The Americans with Disabilities Act was not enacted
until 1991. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2000).
166. See JOEL W. FRIEDMAN & GEORGE M. STRICKLER, THE LAW OF EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION 246 (Foundation Press 2000).
167. See supra text accompanying notes 77–79.
168. See Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). See also McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (in which the Court constructed the burden and order of proof in an
intentional discrimination case).
169. See Rehabilitate, supra note 18, at 1409–10. After Hazen Paper, the courts ceased to
apply the disparate impact theory to the ADEA. City of Jackson then clarified that the theory does
apply to the ADEA. See supra Part III.A.

2009]

Reasonable Factors Other Than Age

71

defense to an ADEA disparate treatment case.170 Whenever the employer makes employment decisions based on a factor that on its face
names a protected class, or a part thereof, such as a policy that denies
employment to women or to persons over forty, the employer is required
to defend the policy using the bona fide occupational qualification
(BFOQ) defense. BFOQ requires the employer to prove that the policy
is essential to the business.171 The defense is strictly construed and is
difficult to prove under both Title VII and the ADEA.172
BFOQ is available as a defense only when the employer has a facially discriminatory policy; consequently, there is a gap in Title VII’s
statutory scheme in the more common circumstance that does not involve
facial discrimination. Because there are no other general defenses to discrimination under Title VII, the courts were called upon not only to define discrimination but to create defenses to both disparate impact and
disparate treatment discrimination.
2. Legitimate Non-Discriminatory Reason
For disparate treatment cases, the Court created the defense of “legitimate non-discriminatory reason.”173 Commentators and courts assumed for many years that “legitimate” meant “proper,” so that a legitimate non-discriminatory reason could not be just any reason that did not
discriminate on its face.174
However, in Hazen Paper v. Biggins,175 the Court held that discriminating based on pension benefits is not per se discriminatory under
the ADEA because the defense to disparate treatment cases is any reason
that does not discriminate on its face.176 The Court said that although
language in prior decisions could be interpreted to mean that the legitimate non-discriminatory reason excludes any employer justification that
is improper, this interpretation is not correct. “For example, it cannot be
170. Title VII and the ADEA also have in common the bona fide seniority system defense, but
it is not helpful to this discussion. See Semantic Cover, supra note 18, at 9.
171. See id. at 34.
172. See Rehabilitate, supra note 18, at 1423.
173. McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792. The Court has decided cases under the
ADEA interpreting legitimate non-discriminatory reason, but it has continued to “assume without
deciding” that legitimate non-discriminatory reason applies to the ADEA. See O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 311 (1996); St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509
U.S. 502, 506 n.1 (1993); but see Hazen Paper v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 612 (1993).
174. See Player, supra note 75, at 334. “The term ‘legitimate’ presupposes that the articulated
reason is lawful. If an employee establishes a prima facie case of sex discrimination, an employer
does not articulate a reason that is ‘legitimate’ by presenting evidence that the employee was illegally discriminated against her because of her race, age or union membership.” Id.
175. Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. 604.
176. Id. at 611.
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true that an employer who fires an older black worker because the worker is black thereby violates the ADEA. The employee’s race is an improper reason, but it is improper under Title VII, not the ADEA.”177
Interpreting legitimate non-discriminatory reason to be “any reason,” regardless of how improper it is, reads out the “legitimate” part of
“legitimate non-discriminatory reason.” This interpretation means that
any factor that does not facially discriminate can be a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason. However, the Court has now recognized in City
of Jackson that RFOA does not mean the same thing as legitimate nondiscriminatory reason.178 Applying RFOA, the Court said that the employer’s justification has to be reasonable.179 Beyond the fact that reasonable must be more than any reason that is not facially discriminatory,
the quest for this article is to define what “reasonable” means.
3. “Any Other Factor Other Than Sex” Under the Equal Pay Act
Because Congress was not legislating in a vacuum when it adopted
RFOA, there are other sources for the meaning of what is reasonable for
RFOA purposes. In Meacham, the Court noted that in enacting the
ADEA, Congress had drawn on the equal pay provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act.180 The Court recognized that the defense of RFOA
was obviously modeled on the Equal Pay Act’s defense of “any other
factor other than sex” (FOTS). Thus, the Court’s decision to treat RFOA
as an affirmative defense was bolstered by the fact that FOTS was already treated as an affirmative defense.181 The Court in City of Jackson
also referenced the FOTS defense to support its determination that
RFOA did not mean just any neutral factor, that is, any factor that is not
facially discriminatory.182

177. Id. at 612.
178. See generally Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 238–39 (2005). The Court said in
City of Jackson that RFOA does not mean any factor other than age. Id. Similarly, the Court in
Hazen Paper stated that legitimate non-discriminatory reason does mean any factor other than age.
507 U.S. at 612.
179. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. at 238–39.
180. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d); Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 128 S. Ct. 2395, 2406
(2008).
181. Meacham, 128 S. Ct. at 2401.
182. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. at 238–39. If RFOA had meant any neutral factor, disparate
impact would not apply under the ADEA, as the Court said was the case under the Equal Pay Act
because of FOTS. Id. at 239 n.11.
The connection between the Equal Pay Act and the ADEA is not limited to the defenses. The
remedial provisions of the ADEA were also drawn from the Fair Labor Standards Act. See Judith J.
Johnson, A Standard for Punitive Damages Under Title VII, 46 FLA. L. REV. 521, 551 (1995) [hereinafter Standard].
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The Equal Pay Act requires that the employer not discriminate on
the basis of sex for employees performing equal work.183 At first blush,
a defense to the Equal Pay Act does not seem relevant to an ADEA discussion. However, because of the Court’s recognition of the connection
between FOTS and RFOA, the meaning of FOTS may be important in
determining what is reasonable under the RFOA defense.
In the first and only case in which the Supreme Court squarely confronted the meaning of FOTS, Corning Glass Works v. Brennan,184 the
Court indicated that “any other factor other than sex” should not include
factors that perpetuate the effects of past discrimination.185 Although the
courts have not been in agreement on what FOTS means after Corning
Glass,186 a similar argument can be made that unjustified criteria that
historically impact older workers should not be considered RFOA’s under the ADEA.
Despite the Equal Pay Act’s language that “any other factor other
than sex” is a defense, many courts require some business justification
for the use of a factor that has historically had an adverse impact on
women.187 Even under the Equal Pay Act, therefore, a factor that correlates with sex is not necessarily considered just “any” factor other than
sex and may not be a sufficient defense.188
183. See Friedman, supra note 166, at 779.
184. 417 U.S. 188 (1974). The Supreme Court held that the employer violated the Equal Pay
Act by paying male night inspection workers at a higher base wage than female day inspection employees. The employer did not cure its violation by permitting women to work as night shift inspectors or by equalizing rates on the two shifts, but retaining “red circle” rate that perpetuated the discrimination. Id. at 209. In City of Jackson, the Supreme Court stated in dicta:
[I]f Congress intended to prohibit all disparate impact claims, it certainly could have done
so. For instance, in the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1), Congress barred
recovery if a pay differential was based “on any other factor”—reasonable or unreasonable—“other than sex.” The fact that Congress provided that employers could use only
reasonable factors in defending a suit under the ADEA is therefore instructive.
544 U.S. at 239 n.11 (emphasis added).
185. 417 U.S. at 209. The Court concluded that “the company’s continued discrimination in
base wages between night and day workers, though phrased in terms of a neutral factor other than
sex, nevertheless operated to perpetuate the effects of the company’s prior illegal practice of paying
women less than men for equal work.” Id.
186. The Court denied certiorari in 1992, refusing to resolve the conflict in the circuits. Aldrich v. Randolph Central Sch. Dst. 963 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 965 (1992)
(White, J., dissenting). In a dissent to the denial of certiorari, Justice White, with two other justices
agreeing, outlined the conflict in the circuits. Id.
187. See, e.g., Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1982).
188. See Player, supra note 75, at 419. “If the factor has a bona fide relationship to employer
concerns, is not premised on gender considerations, and is uniformly applied, it will be a ‘factor
other than sex.’” Id.
An illustration of how courts have interpreted FOTS is in the treatment of whether the use of
previous salary to determine present salary is an FOTS because past salary tends to perpetuate historical discrimination against women. In Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., the court concluded that the
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Although the Court has recognized that FOTS was the model for
the RFOA defense, it noted that the addition of the word “reasonable” to
RFOA indicates a congressional concern that RFOA be more limited
than FOTS.189 Thus, with many courts elevating the proof required for
FOTS to require a business justification for criteria that have historically
discriminated against women, the case for requiring an age-correlated
factor to be more justified is even stronger.
After Hazen Paper, a legitimate non-discriminatory reason does not
have to be rationally related to the employer’s goals; however, FOTS
may fill this gap. In addition, the Court created another defense that does
require a rational relationship to the employer’s goals, the defense of
“business justification,” as a defense to disparate impact. Because business justification is an interpretation of the business necessity defense,
that defense must also be examined.
4. Business Justification and Business Necessity in Title VII Cases
Title VII prohibits not only intentional discrimination, but also discrimination that has a disproportionate impact on the protected class.190
Disparate impact is generally associated with unintentional discrimination, in which the employer is using a neutral factor that has an incidental
impact on the protected class. However, disparate impact can also detect
intentional discrimination that is difficult to prove.191 In Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., the Court said that if the employer uses an employment criteemployer cannot use such a factor “which causes a wage differential between male and female employees absent an acceptable business reason.” 691 F.2d at 876. In Glenn v. General Motors Corp.,
841 F.2d 1567, 1570 (11th Cir. 1988), the Eleventh Circuit went further and said that relying on past
salary was per se not an FOTS, except in limited circumstances. The court cited Corning Glass
Works v. Brennen, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1988), in which the Court rejected the market force theory
that allowed women to be paid less because this was the evil the Act was designed to eliminate.
Similarly, in Taylor v. White, 321 F.3d 710, 719 (8th Cir. 2002), the court rejected the “reasonableness” requirement, but said that the record must be carefully reviewed “for evidence that contradicts
an employer’s claim of gender-neutrality.”
Obviously, if a factor that correlates with sex must be justified in some way to be “any other
factor other than sex,” it is even more evident that “reasonable factors other than age” must be justified.
189. Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 128 S. Ct. 2395, 2401 (2008).
190. See supra text accompanying notes 74–81.
191. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987). Professor Lawrence argued that proof of discriminatory intent does not cure the problem of workplace discrimination, which is a by-product of
societal discrimination, largely brought about by unconscious discrimination. See also David B.
Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899 (1993). Professor Oppenheimer
suggests that since most discrimination is unintentional, a better theory of discrimination would be
based on negligence, rather than intent. Disparate impact theory would more effectively eradicate
societal discrimination, including age discrimination. See Semantic Cover, supra note 18, at 58
n.251 for further discussion of this issue.
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rion that has a disparate impact on a protected class under Title VII, the
employer must justify it as a business necessity.192 Before Congress enacted the 1991 Civil Rights Act, the Court had not provided an exact
meaning of business necessity.193 Generally, business necessity required
the employer to prove that the criterion having the disparate impact predicted success in the job.194
To prove business necessity, the EEOC Selection Guidelines require the employer to validate employment criteria by one of three psychological methods195—an expensive and difficult process.196 The Court
has cited the guidelines with approval, emphasizing that criteria must be
“predictive of or significantly correlated with important elements of
work behavior which comprise or are relevant to the job or jobs for
which candidates are being evaluated.”197
Until 1989, the lower courts agreed that employment criteria having
a disparate impact had to be justified by business necessity, and that
meant the criterion predicted success in the job.198 In 1989, the Court
decided in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio199 that the plaintiff bore

192. 410 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). “The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment
practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the
practice is prohibited.” Id.
193. See Mack A. Player, Is Griggs Dead? Reflecting (Fearfully) on Wards Cove Packing Co.
v. Atonio, 17 FLA. U.L. REV. 1, 2 (1989).
194. See BARBARA LINDEMANN SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAW 112–14 (2d ed. 1983).
195. EEOC Selection Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(A) (1994).
Evidence of the validity of a test or other selection procedure by a criterion-related validity study should consist of empirical data demonstrating that the selection procedure is
predictive of or significantly correlated with important elements of job performance. . . .
Evidence of the validity of a test or other selection procedure by a content validity study
should consist of data showing that the content of the selection procedure is representative of important aspects of performance on the job for which the candidates are to be
evaluated. . . . Evidence of validity of a test or other selection procedure through a construct validity study should consist of data showing that the procedure measures the degree to which candidates have identifiable characteristics which have been determined to
be important in successful performance in the job for which the candidates are to be evaluated.
Id. at § 1607.5(B).
196. See SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 194, at 68–73.
197. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 433 U.S. 321, 331 n.14 (1975).
198. See Friedman, supra note 166, at 252.
199. 490 U.S. 642 (1989). Until that point, the courts universally held that once the plaintiff
demonstrated a prima facie case by showing that an employment practice had an adverse impact, the
employer had to bear the burden of proof and persuasion to show that the practice was justified by
business necessity. Id.; see also Howard Eglit, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title
VII, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991: Three Acts and a Dog That Didn’t Bark, 39 WAYNE L. REV.
1093, 1129–30 (1993). Professor Player succinctly explained the effect Wards Cove had on the
burden of proof:
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the burden of persuasion throughout the case and that the employer’s
burden of proving its defense was not as onerous as previously
thought.200 According to Wards Cove, when justifying its actions, the
employer must show that “the challenged practice serves, in a significant
way, the legitimate employment goals of the employer,” but it is not necessary that the practice be “essential” or “indispensable” to the business.201 At this point, as with all disparate impact cases, if the employer
met its burden of proof, the employee could still win by showing an alternative selection criterion that had less of a disparate impact.202
Shortly after Wards Cove, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of
1991, which was principally directed at correcting Wards Cove’s interpretation of the protections offered by Title VII.203 Among other things,
the Act codified the disparate impact test and clarified the burden of
proof by providing that, once the plaintiff has shown disparate impact,
the employer must bear the burden of proof and persuasion to demonstrate that the practice is “job related to the position in question and consistent with business necessity.”204
In City of Jackson, the Supreme Court ruled that because the provisions of the 1991 Civil Rights Act that overruled Wards Cove for Title
VII did not specifically include the ADEA, Wards Cove continued to
Wards Cove Packing procedurally rewrote the assumption that the burden was on the
employer to prove the business necessity of the device proven to have an adverse impact.
It held that the employer’s burden was no more than that of presenting evidence that the
challenged device significantly served a legitimate employer interest. The ultimate burden was on the plaintiff to prove that the challenged device did not serve the employer’s
business interests. Wards Cove Packing was also seen by some as substantively diluting
the content of “business necessity.” Although the Court emphasized that the employer’s
reasons must be business related and that these ends must be significantly served, the
Court moved away from any suggestion of “necessity” and utilized language that suggested mere “legitimacy” would suffice to justify adverse impact.
Player, supra note 22, at 836.
200. See Friedman, supra note 166, at 252.
201. 490 U.S. at 659 (citations omitted).
202. Wards Cove added another obstacle to the plaintiff’s case. He would win at this stage
only if the employer refused the suggested alternative. 490 U.S. at 661.
203. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
§ 2. Findings
The Congress finds that—
(1) additional remedies under Federal Law are needed to deter unlawful harassment and intentional discrimination in the workplace;
(2) the decision of the Supreme Court in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,
490 U.S. 642 (1989) has weakened the scope and effectiveness of Federal civil rights protections; and
(3) legislation is necessary to provide additional protections against unlawful
discrimination in employment.
204. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (Supp. III 1991). The Act defines the term “demonstrate”: “The
term ‘demonstrate’ means meets the burden of production and persuasion.” Id. § 2000e.
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apply to the ADEA.205 The applicable defense, however, is RFOA instead of business necessity.206 Additionally, as opposed to Wards Cove,
in an ADEA case the plaintiff does not have an opportunity to show a
less discriminatory alternative to counter the defense.207 Subsequently,
in Meacham, the Court clarified that the Wards Cove requirement that
the burden of persuasion rests on the plaintiff at all times did not apply to
the ADEA because RFOA is an affirmative defense, as to which the employer bears the burden of persuasion.208
Before City of Jackson, there was a good argument that RFOA
should be equated with business necessity, and it is true that the EEOC
and the Department of Labor regulations indicated that RFOA should
predict success in the job, which was the generally accepted meaning of
business necessity. City of Jackson precluded that argument.209 Yet it
can still be argued that RFOA should be equated with Wards Cove’s
business justification defense. The next part explores these arguments.
V. WHERE DOES RFOA FIT IN THE HIERARCHY OF EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION DEFENSES?
A. Generally
Where does RFOA belong in this hierarchy of defenses to various
employment discrimination claims? Obviously RFOA has to fit somewhere between BFOQ, which is the most difficult defense to prove, and
legitimate non-discriminatory reason, which is the easiest defense to
prove. It is not necessary for RFOA to be as strict as BFOQ. In fact, this
would conflict with the statutory scheme that distinguishes between the
two defenses.210 Similarly, business necessity, which requires validation
to show that a criterion predicts success in the job,211 would also seem to
be a stricter standard than Congress intended. In any event, City of Jackson said that the defense is not business necessity.212 “Any other factor
other than sex” sheds some light on the best solution, which is that the
employer should have to justify using criteria that correlate with age.213
For criteria not correlated with age, business justification provides guid205. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 239 (2005).
206. Id. at 238–39.
207. Id. at 243.
208. Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 128 S. Ct. 2395, 2402 (2008).
209. See supra text accompanying notes 151–53 for a full explanation of the EEOC regulations
in this regard.
210. See supra note 71.
211. See supra Part IV.B.4.
212. See supra note 105.
213. See supra Part IV.B.3.
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ance for justifying such factors as furthering the employer’s legitimate
goals.214 One point is clear: RFOA should not be as lax as legitimate
non-discriminatory reason because this would allow any employer conduct that it not facially discriminatory.215 Unfortunately, despite the fact
that City of Jackson said that RFOA must be reasonable216 and is thus not
the same as legitimate non-discriminatory reason,217 courts are still
equating the two.218
B. Judicial Interpretations of RFOA
1. Supreme Court
In both Meacham and City of Jackson, the Court overextended itself and made pronouncements that affected the meaning of RFOA.219
The Court in both cases said that RFOA could disproportionately affect
the protected class, and even then, the defense would not be difficult to
prove.220 However, the issue of RFOA was neither briefed nor argued in
either case.221
In City of Jackson, the Court held that the plaintiffs had not identified the part of the plan that was causing the disparate impact, so they did
not prove a prima facie case.222 Nevertheless, the Court reached out and
decided that, even if the plaintiffs had proven a prima facie case, RFOA
should be the defense, and, without further analysis, it determined that
the City of Jackson’s plan was reasonable.223 The Court said that the
City of Jackson had used the factors of seniority and position, which
would always be reasonable.224 This may be true if seniority is used to
grant a benefit to those with greater seniority, but surely not if it is used
to impose a detriment. The city used greater seniority and higher posi214. See supra Part IV.B.4.
215. See supra Part IV.B.2.
216. 544 U.S. at 538–39.
217. See supra Part IV.B.2 and text accompanying note 178.
218. See, e.g., Whittington v. Nordam Group, Inc., 429 F.3d 986, 997 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing
jury instructions that included the following: “If, however, Plaintiff persuades you . . . then you must
consider Defendant’s defense that its actions regarding Plaintiff’s employment were based upon a
reasonable factor other than age discrimination. . . . [R]emember that Defendant must only articulate
a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions.”); Armstrong v. Jackson, No. 05-0075, 2006
WL 2024975, at *6 (D.D.C. July 17, 2006); Reese v. Potter, No. 03-1987, 2005 WL 3274052, at *5
(D.D.C. Sept. 28, 2005); Embrico v. U.S. Steel Corp., 404 F. Supp. 2d 802, 829 (E.D. Penn. 2005).
In all of these cases, the courts equated RFOA with legitimate non-discriminatory reason.
219. See supra text accompanying notes 99, 130–31.
220. Id.
221. See supra notes 95, 130, 137, and text accompanying notes.
222. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 241 (2005).
223. Id. at 239.
224. Id. at 242–43.
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tion to the detriment of those employees with more seniority and higher
positions.225 Greater seniority and higher position correlate strongly with
age and should never be reasonable unless justified.226
The Court also said that the city’s desire to attract and retain officers was a legitimate goal,227 which is certainly true; however, at this
point, the Court was confusing the goal with the method of achieving it.
The Court provided no explanation for why the city’s decision to use
greater seniority and higher position as criteria to confer a detriment was
reasonable.228 Part of the employer’s burden to show reasonableness
should be to show why it was necessary to use an age-correlated factor to
detrimentally affect the protected class.
In Meacham, the Court did not accept certiorari on the issue of
“[w]hether respondents’ practice of conferring broad discretionary authority upon individual managers to decide which employees to lay off
during a reduction in force constituted a ‘reasonable factor other than
age’ as a matter of law.”229 Nevertheless, despite the fact that the Court
said it was expressing no views on the issue, it gratuitously noted that
putting the burden of proving RFOA on the defendant will matter only in
the cases “where the reasonableness of the non-age factor is obscure for
some reason . . . .”230
Thus, Meacham and City of Jackson both said that RFOA could
disadvantage the protected class and made pronouncements that affect

225. Id.
226. See supra Part IV.A.
227. 544 U.S. at 242–43.
228. This is contrary to the Court’s view in other cases, in which it has protected seniority to
the detriment of other federal rights. In US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002), the Court
held that accommodating the plaintiff’s disability by overriding the seniority system was not a reasonable accommodation in the usual case under the Americans with Disabilities Act. “[W]hether
collectively bargained or unilaterally imposed by the employer, seniority systems provide ‘important
employee benefits by creating, and fulfilling, employee expectations of fair, uniform treatment.’” Id.
at 404–05. “The lower courts have unanimously found that collectively bargained seniority trumps
the need for reasonable accommodation.” Id. at 403. Similarly, in TWA v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63
(1977), the Court said that “[c]ollective bargaining aimed at effecting workable and enforceable
agreements between management and labor, lies at the core of our national labor policy, and seniority provisions are universally included in these contracts.” Id. at 84. Furthermore, in Int’l Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), the Court upheld the exemption to Title VII for
bona fide seniority systems:
[A]lthough a seniority system inevitably tends to perpetuate the effects of pre-Act discrimination in such cases, the congressional judgment was that Title VII should not outlaw the use of existing seniority lists and thereby destroy or water down the vested seniority rights of employees simply because their employer had engaged in discrimination
prior to the passage of the Act.
Id. at 352–53.
229. Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 128 S. Ct. 2395, 2400 n.8 (2008).
230. Id. at 2406.
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the meaning of RFOA.231 In City of Jackson, the Court said that the plan
was reasonable with little analysis,232 and in Meacham, the Court commented on when RFOA would make a difference, also without analysis.233 Again, in neither case had the issue of RFOA been briefed or argued.234 The lower courts have taken these hints and found proof of
RFOA to be anything but onerous.
2. Lower Courts After City of Jackson
Following the decision in City of Jackson, lower courts continue to
confuse legitimate non-discriminatory reasons with RFOA’s reasonableness standard by ignoring alternative measures that contribute to the
overall reasonableness of the action in question. The fact that both Meacham and City of Jackson said that the plaintiff may no longer show less
discriminatory alternatives has added to the lower courts’ failure to scrutinize justifications interposed by employers as reasonable. The lower
court’s opinion in the Meacham case is instructive as to this trend.235
There were two circuit court opinions appealed to the Supreme
Court in Meacham.236 In the first opinion, the lower court applied the
Wards Cove order of proof.237 To reiterate, Wards Cove requires the
plaintiff to prove a prima facie case, to which the employer must respond
with a business justification; the plaintiff can win only by showing a less
discriminatory alternative.238 In the original Meacham opinion, the court
decided that the plaintiffs had proven a prima facie case by showing that
the employer’s subjective assessments of “criticality” and “flexibility”
caused a disparate impact,239 but that the employer articulated a business
justification of workforce reduction. The plaintiffs prevailed only because they were allowed to present proof of a less discriminatory alternative—that the same result could have been achieved with more objective
evaluations.240
The defendants then appealed, and the Court remanded for reconsideration in light of City of Jackson.241 The court of appeals remanded
231. Id. at 2403, 2406; City of Jackson, 544 U.S. at 241.
232. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. at 242–43.
233. Meacham, 128 S. Ct. at 2406–07.
234. See supra notes 95, 130, 137.
235. Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 461 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2006) (on remand from the
Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of Smith v. City of Jackson) [hereinafter Meacham II].
236. Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 381 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2004) [hereinafter Meacham I]; Meacham II, 461 F.3d.
237. Meacham I, 381 F.3d at 74.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 199–202.
239. Meacham I, 381 F.3d at 74.
240. Meacham I, 381 F.3d at 74–75.
241. Meacham II, 461 F.3d at 137.
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the case to the district court with instructions to enter judgment as a matter of law for the defendant.242 On remand, the lower court held that because City of Jackson said that the order of proof ended with the defendant’s articulation, the RIF plan was reasonable. In other words, the
plaintiffs lost on remand because they were no longer allowed to show a
less discriminatory alternative.243 The defendant’s facially legitimate
business justification for reducing its workforce, while at the same time
retaining employees who had skills that were critical to the operation,
was sufficient to absolve it of liability. The fact that the decisions were
made almost totally subjectively using age-correlated factors did not figure into the court’s determination that the justification was reasonable.244
Although the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the decision
because the court of appeals had put the burden of persuasion on the
plaintiffs, the Court did agree that the plaintiffs could no longer show
less discriminatory alternatives.245 The Court also opined that putting the
burden of persuasion on the defendant might not make any difference in
the lower court’s decision.246
It surely cannot be the case that a plaintiff could win under the less
strenuous standard of proof in Wards Cove,247 under which the defendant
has no burden of persuasion, and yet lose when the burden of persuasion
is placed on the defendant to show that its plan was reasonable. In situations where the impact of using age-related factors will predictably fall
on older employees, the employer is at least reckless with regard to
whether he is discriminating against the protected class. In such situations, part of the showing of reasonableness must be the lack of suitable
alternatives.
Instead of showing reasonableness by way of a lack of suitable alternatives, however, the lower courts are deciding that age-correlated
factors standing alone are reasonable factors other than age. By deciding
cases in this way, the courts are creating case law that is counter to the
protections afforded by the ADEA.
For example, in Townsend v. Weyerhaeuser Co., the court opined
that “[c]ertainly, an employer that decides to terminate an employee to
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. See id.
245. Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 128 S. Ct. 2395, 2405 n.14 (2008).
246. Id. at 2406. The court of appeals remanded the case to the district court, Meacham v.
Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, 302 Fed. Appx. 748 (2d. Cir. 2009), and the district court held
that the defendants had waived the defense of RFOA and reinstated the judgment for the plaintiffs.
Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, No. 97-CV-12, 2009 WL 1212797 (N.D.N.Y. May 1,
2009).
247. See supra text accompanying notes 199–202.
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relieve itself of the burden of that employee’s high salary or health care
costs has based its decision on ‘reasonable factors’ other than the employee’s age.”248 This is exactly what the ADEA was enacted to prevent—discrimination based on factors so closely correlated with age that
the factors disguise actual age discrimination.249
Similarly, in Silver v. Leavitt,250 the court said that the defendant
had valid concerns regarding its strained budget, the cost of salaries and
benefits, attracting new workers, and losing a large number of employees. The court said that it was reasonable for the defendant to recruit
candidates at the lowest level possible in order to accomplish its goals.
“By recruiting workers who cost less to employ and are less likely to retire in the near future, defendant was arguably making the most of the
money spent on the selection, hiring, and training of employees.”251 This
is an obvious example of court-approved age discrimination, and a decision of this sort directly contravenes the intent of the ADEA.
Even more explicitly contradicting the purpose of the ADEA, the
court in Rollins v. Clear Creek Independent School District flatly said
that retirement status was a reasonable factor other than age.252 In Aldridge v. City of Memphis, another case producing an astounding interpretation of disparate impact under the ADEA, the city eliminated the
position of captain of the police force to cut costs.253 The court said that
because promotion to captain was automatic after thirty years of service,
this assured that all captains were in the protected age group. The court
therefore reasoned that because this statistical disparity was expected,
248. Townsend v. Weyerhaeuser Co., No. 04-563, 2005 WL 1389197, at *14 (W.D. Wis. June
13, 2005).
249. See supra Part IV.A.
250. Silver v. Leavitt, No. 05-0968, 2006 WL 626928, at *14 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2006).
251. Id. (emphasis added). In Turner v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., No. 05-5061, 2005 WL
3487788 (N.D. Ill. 2005), the court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim, citing Smith, but it did not comment on the employer’s statement that its practices, such as
greater seniority, which allegedly had a disparate impact, were related to RFOAs. Id. at *3.
252. Rollins v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 06-081, 2006 WL 3302538, at *5 (S.D. Tex.
Nov. 13, 2006). A state statute required the school district to give hiring preference to teachers who
had not previously retired. Id. In order to comply with the statute, the school district developed a
policy: teachers who had retired and then been rehired were required to re-apply, rather than having
their contracts automatically renewed. Id. at *1. Although 100% of the contracts of the people in
the protected class were not renewed, the court said the policy was not discriminatory under either
disparate treatment or disparate impact theories. Id. at *3, *5. With regard to disparate treatment,
the employer had acted based on retirement, which was a legitimate non-discriminatory reason because it was a trait that was analytically distinct from age. Id. at *3. In the disparate impact portion
of the opinion, the court said that the employer’s desire to give preference to non-retired teachers
who were not drawing a pension was an RFOA. Id. at *5. The court granted summary judgment in
this obvious case of age discrimination.
253. Aldridge v. City of Memphis, No. 05-2966, 2008 WL 2999557 (W.D. Tenn. July 31,
2008).
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there could be no inference of discrimination.254 In other words, the method of saving money caused a completely predictable 100% impact on
the protected class but was not considered sufficient evidence of disparate impact.255
What is this but allowing blatant age discrimination to be an
RFOA?256 Allocating the burden of persuasion is irrelevant if courts are
going to allow retirement, seniority, and higher healthcare costs to be
RFOAs.257 So far, the courts (and the Court) have not distinguished between those factors that correlate obviously with age and those that are
just incidentally shown to have a disparate impact on older employees.
The latter should be easier to justify; the former should be more difficult.
The most important point here is that if the employer chooses a factor
that obviously correlates with age, RFOA should require proof of justification. It should be clear that if the employer is reckless about using a
factor that screens out older employees, he is very close to intentionally
discriminating, and such a factor should not be an RFOA without further
justification.
VI. PROPOSED SOLUTION TO THE MEANING OF RFOA
RFOA should not require validation in the usual case, as would
business necessity. However, when the criterion has a predictably disparate impact on the protected class, the employer should have to show
more than that the criterion served his legitimate goal. If the employer is
acting with a sufficiently culpable state of mind with regard to whether
the criterion treats the protected class less favorably, he should not be
able to interpose the criterion itself as a reasonable method of achieving
254. Id. at *7.
255. The court also accepted the defendant’s reason that it “had no need for a management
level rank achieved solely by length of service,” that it “was not operationally necessary,” and that it
resulted in a substantial savings. Id. at *8. Quoting City of Jackson v. Smith, the court noted that
there may have been other ways for the city to accomplish its goals, but it had to show only that this
one was reasonable. Id.
256. Policies that are facially discriminatory have to be defended by proof that age is a bona
fide occupational qualification. See supra Part IV.B.1; but see Kentucky Retirement Sys. v. EEOC,
128 S. Ct. 2361 (2008). In a blatant misinterpretation of the ADEA, the Court decided that a facially
discriminatory disability policy was not discrimination because of age. Kentucky Retirement Sys.,
128 S. Ct. at 2364. The plan provided less in benefits for people who became disabled after they
became eligible for retirement—at age fifty-five or after twenty years of employment—than for
those who became disabled at a younger age. Id. at 2365. Although this was facially discriminatory,
the Court said that there was no intent to discriminate based on age. As the dissent said: “The
Court’s apparent rationale is that, even when it is evident that a benefits plan discriminates on its
face on the basis of age, an ADEA plaintiff still must provide additional evidence that the employer
acted with an ‘underlying motive’ to treat older workers less favorably than younger workers.” Id. at
2373 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
257. High position also generally correlates with age. See, e.g., Aldridge, 2008 WL 2999557.
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his goals without further justification. In this way, the purpose of the
ADEA will be fulfilled because improper factors will not be used to substantiate the RFOA defense.
City of Jackson is a perfect illustration. To justify its pay plan, the
city articulated the legitimate goal of recruiting and retaining police officers.258 What the Court failed to appreciate was that to achieve that goal,
the city was using the obviously age-correlated factors of greater seniority and higher position.259 In this situation, the city was at least reckless
with regard to whether the criteria would screen out older employees.
In such a case of reckless disregard, the employer should have to
justify the criteria used to achieve the goal, not just the goal itself. In
other words, any employer using criteria that obviously correlate with
age should be considered reckless with regard to whether he is discriminating based on age, in which case he should have a heavier burden to
prove RFOA. The employer should have to prove not only that the goal
was legitimate, but also that a less discriminatory alternative was not feasible.
Surely an employer acting recklessly with regard to whether he is
discriminating could not also be declared reasonable without more, as the
Court did in City of Jackson.260 Under the ADEA, if the employer is
reckless with regard to whether he is violating the Act, he is guilty of a
willful violation and must pay liquidated damages.261 It is counterintuitive that an employer who would otherwise be guilty of a willful violation would be exonerated of liability because the criterion he recklessly
used was an RFOA.262
There may be other situations in which the employer may have
acted recklessly without using obviously age-correlated factors. For example, in Meacham, the employer also had a legitimate goal of cutting
258. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 242–43 (2005).
259. Id.
260. Recklessness is already an important consideration in ADEA cases. If the employer is
guilty of a reckless violation of the ADEA, he has committed a willful violation and has to pay liquidated damages. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b)–(c) (1988). See Standard, supra note 182, at 41. For a discussion of the meaning of reckless indifference for the purpose of awarding punitive damages under
Title VII, see Kolstad v. American Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 535–37 (1999) (equating the standard for punitive damages under Title VII with the standard for liquidated damages under the
ADEA).
261. See, e.g., Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 506 U.S. 604, 616–17 (1993).
262. The inquiry is somewhat different in that recklessness for willful violations looks at the
employer’s state of mind regarding violating the Act. See Semantic Cover, supra note 18, at 47–49.
With regard to liability, the employer’s state of mind relates to his state of mind regarding treating
people in the protected class differently. Id. The employer may believe that he has a defense to the
discrimination, for example, so that he may be intending to treat people in the protected class differently, but he thinks that his reason is a BFOQ. For the history of the standard for imposing liquidated damages under the ADEA, see id. at 86–91.
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costs. This goal was accomplished using “criticality” and “flexibility”
criteria,263 which were not as obviously age-correlated as those used in
City of Jackson. The method of achieving the goal was to use subjective
evaluations, however, and the criteria were shown to have a disparate
impact on older employees.264 Such criteria could predictably be used to
stereotype older employees as less flexible and less critical to the organization.265 In this case, the employer should have to show that subjectively evaluating the candidates for RIF was a reasonable method of
achieving the goal, which should require a showing that less discriminatory alternatives were not available.
If the employer has a legitimate goal and was not reckless in the
methods he used to accomplish his goal—in other words, the criteria he
used would not predictably affect the protected class negatively—then
RFOA should be easier to prove. Proof akin to business justification
would be sufficient; the employer would have to show only that the selection criterion was reasonably related to his legitimate goals.266 For
example, in Walker v. City of Cabot,267 the plaintiff complained that the
employer’s reduction in force disproportionately impacted the protected
class.268 The employer’s justification was the need to eliminate redundant positions to save money, which the court said was reasonable. In
the plaintiff’s case, the method of choosing him for the RIF involved re263. Meacham II, 461 F.3d 134, 139 (2d Cir. 2006).
264. Id.; see also Kaminshine, supra note 44, at n.127 (citing to discussions of subjective evaluations).
265. See supra text accompanying notes 53–55. Stereotyping and discrimination often appear
to be unconscious phenomena:
In fact, the Wirtz Report sounded a warning against the allowance of such post-action rationalization when it noted that “discriminatory practices [against older workers] were often defended on grounds apparently different from their actual explanation.” Smith v.
City of Jackson, 315 F.3d 183, 194 n.13 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting the Wirtz Report at 7).
Such an exercise in legal rationalization may serve to perpetuate unconscious discrimination. As the American Psychological Association noted in an amicus curiae brief to the
Supreme Court, “research indicates that stereotyping is part of the normal psychological
process of categorization that, under pertinent conditions, can lead to inaccurate generalizations about individuals often transformed into discriminatory behavior.” Brief for
American Psychological Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 4,
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (No. 87-1167).
Bentley, supra note 63, at 370.
266. See Wards Cove Packing Co. Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989).
267. No. 4:08-00139, 2008 WL 4816617 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 4, 2008) (granting summary judgment for defendant). In this case, the plaintiff alleged that the RIF had a disparate impact based on
age because the majority of employees whose jobs were eliminated were in the protected group. Id.
at *2. Rejecting this allegation, the court said that the plaintiff had not identified the particular practice causing the disparate impact. Id. Nevertheless, the court decided that even if the plaintiff had
proved his case of disparate impact, the defendant’s justification was reasonable. Id. at *4. The
court thus held that the defendant’s motion for summary judgment was properly granted. Id. at *3.
268. Id. at *2.
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turning his duties to the position from which they had been taken to create his job.269 In such a case, neither the goal, eliminating redundant positions, nor the method of achieving the goal, reassigning job duties, appears to be correlated with age. Thus, the employer has shown that his
goal was legitimate and his method of accomplishing it was reasonable.
In other words, the selection criterion was rationally related to the employer’s legitimate goal.
In sum, the solution to the meaning of RFOA depends on identifying those situations in which the defendant recklessly used a factor that is
likely to discriminate. If so, he should be held to a higher standard to
prove RFOA. Proof of the accidental use of a factor that has a disparate
impact should require less onerous proof, similar to a business justification.
When will the employer be considered reckless? What does this
state of mind mean in this context? To put the states of mind required
for employment discrimination in context, disparate treatment discrimination requires intentional discrimination,270 while disparate impact discrimination does not require proof of intentional discrimination.271 Disparate impact requires only statistical proof that an employment criterion
adversely affects the protected class.272
The meaning of intent to discriminate under the anti-discrimination
acts is akin to the purposeful or intentional state of mind in criminal
law.273 The Court has recognized that reference to criminal states of
mind is appropriate to describe recklessness in the discrimination context.274 In addition, the criminal states of mind cover all the possibilities
269. Id. at *4.
270. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
271. See, e.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 988 (1988).
272. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); see also Steven L. Willborn, The Disparate Impact Model of Discrimination: Theory and Limits, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 799 (1985) (discussing
the difference between the two theories).
273. See Standard, supra note 182 at 534–35. Will the Court say that this is confusing disparate impact with disparate treatment, as it has in other cases? See Raytheon v. Hernandez, 540 U.S.
44, 52 (2003). This is simply not the case. The Court has made it clear that knowledge is insufficient to prove intentional discrimination. See Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256
(1979). In addition, the Court has said that the line between disparate impact and disparate treatment
is not always distinct. For example, in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988),
the Court was presented with the question of whether subjective decision making was subject to the
disparate impact theory or could be proven only under the disparate treatment theory. Id. at 977–78.
The Court decided that the disparate impact theory would be nullified if it did not apply to subjective
decision making. Whether the criteria are objective or subjective, a facially neutral policy may have
effects that are not distinguishable from intentionally discriminatory practices. “Even if one assumed that any such discrimination can be adequately policed through disparate treatment analysis,
the problem of subconscious stereotypes and prejudices would remain.” Id. at 989–91.
274. See Kolstad v. American Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 536 (1999) (equating the standard
for punitive damages under Title VII with the standard for liquidated damages under the ADEA and
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in this context and are capable of accurate definition.275 Thus, if the defendant intends to do the act that brings about the statutorily proscribed
result—for example, if he intends to treat people of another race differently because of their race—then the defendant has acted with specific
intent comparable to purposefulness in criminal law.276 The Supreme
Court has said that knowing that the criterion discriminates against persons in a protected class is insufficient to prove intentional discrimination.277 The employer must be using the criterion with the intent to cause
the discrimination.278 In other words, the employer must act with the
purpose of discriminating. If he acts only knowingly, which is doing the
act knowing that the result is practically certain to occur, he is not guilty
of intentional discrimination.279 In a disparate impact case, an employer
imposing a criterion that he knows discriminates should not escape liabil-

cited a criminal standard). The Court looked at the standard for punitive damages developed under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, which requires that the defendant’s conduct be shown to “be motivated by evil
motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights
of others.” Id. at 537. The minimum standard under § 1983 is recklessness, a “‘subjective consciousness of a risk of injury or illegality and a ‘criminal indifference to civil obligations.’” Id.
(emphasis added). The Court explained that criminal law employs this subjective form of recklessness and requires that the defendant “disregards a risk of harm of which he is aware.” Id. Justice
Stevens also invoked a criminal standard in his concurrence and dissent:
The ADEA provides for an award of liquidated damages—damages that are “punitive in
nature”—when the employer “knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of
whether its conduct was prohibited by the statute.”
. . . In Thurston, we interpreted the ADEA’s standard the same way and explained
that the relevant mental distinction between intentional discrimination and “reckless disregard” for federally protected rights is essentially the same as the well-known difference
between a “knowing” and a “willful” violation of a criminal law. [W]hile a criminal defendant, like an employer, need not have knowledge of the law to act “knowingly” or intentionally, he must know that his acts violate the law or must “careless[ly] disregard
whether or not one has the right so to act” in order to act “willfully.” We interpreted the
word “willfully” the same way in the civil context. See McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe
Co., 486 U.S. 128, 133, 108 S. Ct. 1677, 100 L.Ed.2d 115 (1988) (holding that the “plain
language of the Fair Labor Standards Act’s “willful” liquidated damages standard requires that “the employer either knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of
whether its conduct was prohibited by the statute,” without regard to the outrageousness
of the conduct at issue).
527 U.S. at 548–49 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
275. See Standard, supra note 182, at 535.
276. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a); see also Standard, supra note 182, at 534–35.
277. Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
278. Id. In Feeney, the Court said, “‘[D]iscriminatory purpose,’ however, implies more than
intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that the decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’
its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” Id. (citation omitted).
279. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b).
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ity by simply interposing that criterion as an RFOA, however.280 City of
Jackson is a good example of an employer acting knowingly. The City
must have known that using reverse seniority would impact the protected
class.281
Recklessness is the next less serious state of mind after knowledge.
Recklessness requires a conscious disregard of a substantial risk that the
statutorily proscribed result will occur.282 Meacham is an example of the
employer acting recklessly. Although the criteria used there (flexibility
and criticality) are not as obviously age-related as those used in City of
Jackson, the employer was reckless in combining those criteria with subjective evaluations. Although the employer may not be guilty of intentional discrimination in either case, recklessness should suffice to elevate
the burden of proving RFOA in a disparate impact case.283
The question of whether the defendant has been reckless should be
a jury question. Again, the state of mind of recklessness is not unknown
under the ADEA. In order to find that the defendant is not guilty of a
willful violation of the ADEA, which would foreclose the imposition of
liquidated damages, the jury must find that the employer “incorrectly but
in good faith and nonrecklessly believes that the statute permits a particular age-based decision . . . .”284
The point of this article is that if the employer is acting with a sufficiently culpable state of mind with regard to whether the criterion treats
the protected class less favorably, he should not be able to interpose the
criterion itself as a reasonable method of achieving his goals without further justification. Thus, if the employer is reckless with regard to whether the criterion discriminates, he should have to justify it by evidence that
there were no reasonable alternatives. If he has a less culpable state of

280. Knowledge is a more serious state of mind than recklessness. Compare MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.02(2)(b) (defining knowledge), with MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (defining recklessness).
281. “[R]everse seniority is almost inherently tied to the age of the employee, [and] such a
reason necessarily is based on age and should lack legitimacy.” Mack A. Player, Proof of Disparate
Treatment Under the Age Discrimination In Employment Act: Variations on A Title VII Theme, 17
GA. L. REV. 621, 656 (1983).
282. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c).
283. It could be argued that even if the employer is only grossly or criminally negligent, he
should have to meet the higher standard to prove RFOA. Under the Model Penal Code, recklessness
requires that the employer be subjectively aware of risk; criminal negligence requires only that a
reasonable person would be aware of the risk. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c), with
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d).
284. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 506 U.S. 604, 616–17 (1993).
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mind, interposing a defense should not require as much proof, as long as
the practice serves his legitimate employment goals.285
The Court has developed a penchant for declaring employer practices reasonable without analysis.286 City of Jackson is emblematic of
this problem. There, the Court said that the use of seniority would always be reasonable without stopping to inquire how the employer used
seniority. The employer in fact used reverse seniority, which should
never be considered reasonable without some justification. This is especially troubling because in several cases, the Court has referred to the
traditional use of seniority—to provide more benefits for greater seniority—as one of the most important rights in employment, and it has protected seniority to the disadvantage of other federally protected employment rights.287 The Court’s proclivity for declaring employer practices
reasonable without analysis must not continue. Otherwise, the ADEA is
in serious jeopardy, as are other anti-discrimination acts that afford similar protections.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Court has held that the ADEA was designed to combat “inaccurate and stigmatizing stereotypes.”288 If obviously age-correlated factors are considered reasonable, older employees can easily be discriminated against based on these stereotypes. The courts that interpreted the
ADEA shortly after its enactment almost uniformly recognized that using
285. ADEA cases are tried before a jury. See Friedman, supra note 166, at 868. Decisions
regarding the defendant’s state of mind are virtually always entrusted to juries in serious criminal
cases. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
286. In a case under Title VII, which requires reasonable accommodation without undue hardship in religion cases, the Court said that the accommodation the employer offered, an unpaid leave,
was reasonable and that the employer need not show that the accommodation requested by the employee was an undue hardship. Ansonia v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 70 (1986). Similarly, in TWA v.
Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84–85 (1977), the Court decided that requiring the employer to bear more
than a de minimis cost, violate the seniority system, burden other employees, or leave the employer
shorthanded would all be undue hardships and thus not reasonable accommodations. Id. at 84.
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, which also requires reasonable accommodation without
undue hardship, in US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 404–05 (2002), the Court said that
overriding the seniority system to accommodate the plaintiff’s disability was not reasonable in the
usual case. The Court cited the standard for reasonable accommodation under the Title VII case of
TWA v. Hardison, despite the fact that Congress had clearly said it was intending to set a more stringent standard for the ADA. Id. at 422 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Although the Court’s misinterpretation of congressional intent has recently required congressional action relating to the ADA, the preamble to that Act did not refer to the Barnett case, and Congress was nevertheless clearly admonishing the Court to pay attention to its prior intention of protecting disabled people. ADA Amendments
Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008). To avoid congressional action regarding
the ADEA, the Court should be more careful in following congressional intent in interpreting RFOA.
287. See discussion, supra note 228.
288. Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 610–611.
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such criteria indicated an intention to discriminate against older employees.289 These courts were stating an obvious truth that the courts today
are failing to see: If an employer chooses a criterion that so obviously
discriminates against older people, he may very well be acting based on
the stereotypes that the ADEA was designed to eradicate, that older people are less competent, less trainable, resistant to change, less promotable, and expected to perform less ably.290 Especially in view of the fact
that these myths have now been thoroughly debunked by the studies
cited earlier,291 age-correlated criteria should be highly scrutinized, not
lightly accepted as reasonable. Even the Court in Hazen Paper, the case
that started the trend to restrictively interpret the ADEA, said:
We do not preclude the possibility that an employer who targets
employees with a particular pension status on the assumption that
these employees are likely to be older thereby engages in age discrimination. Pension status may be a proxy for age, not in the sense
that the ADEA makes the two factors equivalent, but in the sense
that the employer may suppose a correlation between the two factors and act accordingly.292

Nevertheless, many courts have subsequently failed to accord any significance to age-correlated criteria.
Despite the Court’s recent decisions that have applied the disparate
impact theory to the ADEA and put the burden of persuasion on the employer to prove the RFOA defense, older employees are still in danger of
losing a large measure of protection under the ADEA. Unless the defendant is required to justify the use of factors that correlate so strongly with
age that he can only be considered reckless, older employees may still be
terminated because they have too much seniority, too much experience,
are close to retirement, and make too much money. These are the exact
employer actions that the ADEA was enacted to prevent.
The quote that introduced this article, to the effect that ageism is a
pernicious problem in the workplace, ends as follows, and I want to end
on a hopeful note, as well:
Nevertheless, older Americans in great numbers continue to work.
And as they continue to succeed in their jobs, we become increasingly hopeful for the future. As greater numbers of older Americans continue to break the negative stereotypes toward older individuals that exist in our society, we feel confident that societal per-

289. See supra cases cited in note 154.
290. See Cuddy & Fiske, supra note 48, at 18.
291. See supra text accompanying notes 47–57.
292. Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 613 (citation omitted).
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ceptions will gradually shift, as well. After all, older Americans are
not just reminders of our past; they are also our future.293

293. See McCann & Giles, supra note 1, at 188.
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